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MAKING HEADS OR TAILS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR BURBANK

MARJORIE O. RENDELL†
In his essay, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, Professor Burbank urges
that judicial independence and judicial accountability are “diﬀerent sides of
the same coin.”1 But I am not so sure, at least as to the way in which he
envisions judicial accountability. Certainly, judges must be accountable—on
this point Professor Burbank and I agree. But accountable to whom or to
what? As we navigate this important question, I ﬁnd many areas of agreement
with Professor Burbank. But our areas of disagreement are important enough
that I felt compelled to write this Essay.
Unlike Professor Burbank, the topic of judicial independence has not
predominated my forty-ﬁve year career. Indeed, while a practicing lawyer, I
probably accepted the notion as a given, without thinking. But upon
becoming a judge, the importance of it hit me rather squarely as I listened to
Justice Souter tell a story about a Russian lawyer who visited the Supreme
Court. The lawyer was well versed in the history of the Court’s opinions and
asked Justice Souter what he thought was the most important opinion of the
modern Supreme Court. Justice Souter replied, as many of us would, that it
was Brown v. Board of Education. Justice Souter could tell, however, that his
answer disappointed the lawyer, so he asked which case the lawyer would have
chosen. The Nixon tapes decision,2 the lawyer responded, because in his
country it was unheard of that a court could tell the head of state what to do.
Justice Souter said that, upon hearing this, he had “an epiphany”: we don’t
teach our children civics; we don’t teach them how unique our system really
† Senior United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1 Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty Years in the Trenches and in the

Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 25 (2019).
2 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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is; and we don’t teach them how it is designed to give judges the independence
to make the tough calls without fear of retribution. At that moment, I too had
an epiphany, and I resolved to spend my judicial career—and my bully pulpit
as First Lady of Pennsylvania—trying to educate our children about ways in
which the Framers crafted a form of government that has been the envy of the
world and, indeed, has been emulated by many nations over the years.3
Let’s jump right in, then, to the concept of judicial independence, and
Professor Burbank’s insightful essay. Judicial independence, as I intend to use
it, describes a state of aﬀairs whereby judges are free to decide cases in
accordance with the rule of law. Many deﬁnitions have been provided for “rule
of law.” But the heart of the principle is that “people in positions of authority
should exercise their power within a constraining framework of wellestablished public norms rather than in an arbitrary, ad hoc, or purely
discretionary manner on the basis of their own preferences or ideology.”4
Thus, the judge’s role in a society governed by rule of law is to be a mere
mouthpiece for the law. As Professor Herbert Weschler stated, “A principled
[legal] decision . . . rests on reasons with respect to all issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved.”5 In other words, judicial decisions must be grounded
in the well-established, neutral principles in a judge’s toolkit, such as ﬁdelity
to the laws as passed by Congress, adherence to precedent, and our
commitment to deciding only the particular case and controversy before us.
So, where does judicial accountability fit in? Professor Burbank suggests,
as I understand his reasoning and decades of writings on the subject, that
accountability requires the judiciary to be responsible to others: “to the
public, . . . . to the people’s representatives, . . . . [and] to courts and the
judiciary as an institution.”6 Given this understanding of independence and
accountability, I must part ways with his belief that judges should be
accountable to external actors: the citizens and their representatives. This is
not to say that I believe judges should ignore all citizens, including the
litigants in our courts. Far from it. We owe a certain duty to citizens: that we
give our full attention to each case, that we take every argument seriously,
that we treat the pro se litigant no differently from the client with counsel
at a prestigious law firm, and that we explain our decisions in a way that is
See generally, e.g., GEORGE BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND
WORLD, 1776–1989: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009) (describing the global inﬂuence of
American constitutionalism).
4 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 22, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/8ELU-XCQA].
5 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
6 Burbank, supra note 1, at 25.
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accessible to nonlawyers. This moral and ethical duty, however, is different
from accountability, which involves being answerable to someone or something.
To my mind, our accountability as judges starts and ends with fealty to
the rule of law. Therefore, accountability, as I understand it, comes from
within—within the Third Branch, on an institutional level, and within the
minds of individual judges, on a personal level. Some of these internal
accountability measures are formal: The system of appellate review holds
district courts accountable to appellate courts;7 appellate judges decide cases
in panels to ensure one judge does not hold the exclusive power of review;8
the Code of Judicial Conduct ensures judges act appropriately and avoid the
appearance of impropriety;9 and the Committees of the Judicial Conference
of the United States oﬀer guidance and assistance if issues of ethics or
disability arise.10 There are also a slew of informal accountability measures,
such as our self-imposed commitment to follow precedent and to support our
orders with thorough, reasoned opinions. These intrabranch measures, as
Professor Burbank describes them, ensure that judges maintain decisional
independence and apply the rule of law consistently.
Calls for external accountability, however, often arise from a fear that judges
are mere “politicians in robes.” That is the notion that, when given the
opportunity, judges will decide a case based on their political agendas rather
than any neutral principles of the rule of law. It is not difficult to see why this
view has spread. There can be no doubt that the judiciary is a part of the
political discourse today in a way that it hasn’t been in the past. Candidates for
office vow to nominate or confirm certain judges with particular interpretive
ideologies or even particular views on cases. Officeholders bring lawsuits to
further their political agendas and criticize or praise the courts depending on
the outcome. And the media often frames judicial decisions, first and foremost,
as a “win” or a “loss” for the political parties. Although I do not interpret
Professor Burbank’s article to suggest that such concerns animate the judiciary,
those concerns inevitably give rise to calls for more accountability, especially
calls for accountability to the people and their representatives.

7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1291 (2018).
8 Id. § 46.
9 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (2019),

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_12_
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6P6-KEHQ].
10 See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PUBLISHED ETHICS ADVISORY
OPINIONS (2019) (compiling the published advisory opinions of the Judicial Conference’s Committee
on Codes of Conduct). For more information about the Judicial Conference, see About the Judicial
Conference, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicialconference/about-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/V2L2-JNNP] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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I hope to accomplish four things with this essay. First, I want to suggest
that fears of a hyperpartisan judiciary are misplaced. Despite conventional
wisdom, in the overwhelming majority of cases judges do their level best to
resolve issues based on the rule of law, not in a way that promotes an agenda.
Second, the current internal accountability measures in place give judges the
independence to make tough decisions while also fostering accountability to
the rule of law. Third, calls for new, external accountability measures,
especially those that would have judges more responsive to public opinion or
Congress, are misplaced and more likely to erode judicial independence than
to strengthen it. And fourth, to the extent there is a fear that judges are mere
politicians in robes, we all, as citizens of the United States, need to make a
more concerted eﬀort to understand and explain the role of the judiciary in
our constitutional system and not undermine its independence. Rather than
calls for more accountability, the goal should be to highlight the
accountability measures already in place, emphasize the role of the judges and
their fealty to the rule of law, and promote respect for our judicial institutions.
I. POLITICIANS IN ROBES?
I’ll start with the elephant in the room: the widespread belief that judges
are merely politicians in robes. I am not suggesting that Professor Burbank
takes such a dim view of judges. But it is important to address it for two
reasons: First, the notion of judges-as-politicians is widespread in our body
politic; and second, our assessment of the truth of this notion has deep
implications for our discussion of judicial independence and judicial
accountability. If judges really are politicians in robes, then that would be an
excellent reason to increase their accountability to the political branches and
to the people. But if judges are, in fact, neutral arbiters—much like umpires
calling balls and strikes, as Chief Justice Roberts has said11—then increased
accountability may only serve to inject politics into a body that is otherwise
independent from those forces. As I will demonstrate, the narrative—some
call it the “attitudinal model”12—that judges make decisions based on their
political preferences is not accurate in the vast majority of cases.
11 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of
John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge
is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.”).
12 See, e.g., JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (“[The attitudinal] model holds that the Supreme
Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-á-vis the ideological attitudes and values
of the justices.”).
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Let’s start by considering a few statistics. In 2018, 358,563 cases (both
criminal and civil) were ﬁled in the U.S. district courts.13 For most cases, the
district court is the ﬁrst and last stop in the litigation; the controversy is
resolved—by way of a settlement, a pretrial motion, or a trial—and the parties
decline to take an appeal.14 Only in approximately 10% of these cases do the
parties decide to take an appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals.15 But even in
those cases—cases which often present diﬃcult or new legal issues—over 95%
are resolved unanimously by three judge panels.16 Whether the judge was
appointed by Presidents Trump, Obama, Bush, Clinton, Bush, or Reagan
(and we have judges appointed by all of these presidents on the Third
Circuit), they agree with each other a remarkable 95% of the time.
What remains are the true puzzles. And the Supreme Court takes about
seventy of these puzzles from the federal appeals courts every year (seventytwo in the most recent term, October 2018).17 But even the cases before the
Supreme Court are not nearly as partisan and political as one might expect.
Take, for example, the most recent term. Nearly half of the cases decided were
either 9–0 or 8–1.18 And of those, 38% were decided unanimously.19 In fact,
9–0 was easily the most common vote alignment this term.20 This is
remarkable. Of the nearly 400,000 federal cases ﬁled every year, only
approximately 70 make it to the Supreme Court—roughly 0.0175% of cases

13 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/8QT7-XHRS] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
14 Id.
15 In 2018, there were 37,596 criminal and civil appeals ﬁled in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Id.
To be sure, the appeals ﬁled in 2018 are, generally speaking, not appeals from cases ﬁled in district
court in the same year. But it does give us a fairly accurate picture of the percentage of cases ﬁled in
District Court that are eventually appealed.
16 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring
Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 815 (ﬁnding, from 1998 to 2009, that the six
circuits surveyed had dissent rates ranging from 1.14% to 4.56%); Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating
Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781, 782 (2011) (“In circuit
courts, however, most cases are decided by consensus, with unanimity rates exceeding 95 percent in
some circuits.”); see also Eugene Kiely, Fact Check: Gorsuch’s Mainstream Measurement, USA TODAY
(Apr. 8, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/07/fact-checkgorsuch-mainstream-measurement/100164252/ [https://perma.cc/3YJD-A2NE] (“[Gorsuch] has
voted nearly 99% of the time with the majority on the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and 97%
of the court’s rulings were unanimous.”).
17 ADAM FELDMAN, FINAL STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2018 1, 30 (2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YWM5-PQD3].
18 Id. at 5.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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ﬁled in the federal system.21 Yet even among that tiny slice of cases—generally
the toughest cases, ones in which several courts have typically weighed in and
taken opposing views—nearly half are decided unanimously or nearunanimously. Perhaps our courts are not quite as divided as they may seem.22
To be sure, approximately a quarter of the Court’s cases were decided by
that much-discussed 5–4 margin (although you’d think it would be much
higher, given the attention those cases receive).23 Still, those 5–4 cases do not
always, or even usually, break down on the traditional “conservative”–”liberal”
divide. Twenty-one cases this term were decided by a 5–4 margin.24 And
although the most common 5–4 majority featured the ﬁve “conservative”
justices, we saw this lineup only seven times.25 The other fourteen 5–4 lineups
consisted of some scramble of the ideological spectrum.26 For example, Justice
Gorsuch joined the majority with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan on four occasions.27 And on another occasion, Justice Ginsburg added
the ﬁfth vote for a majority including Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and
the Chief Justice.28 Interestingly, in 5–4 cases, the four “liberal” justices
formed a majority with one “conservative” justice more often (nine times)
than the ﬁve “conservative” justices voted as a bloc (seven times).29 And every
“conservative” justice was, for at least one decision, the lone “conservative”
justice with the four “liberal” justices.30
21 See U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS – NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD FILE
2014–2019 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QKT7-LC5V] (recording, on average, about 387,000 cases ﬁled yearly, using
September terms, in the federal district courts from 2014–2019).
22 I am not the first to observe that our courts are less divided than they may seem. See, e.g.,
Max Bloom, The Supreme Court Still Knows How to Find a Consensus, NAT’L REV. (June 29, 2017,
4:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/06/unanimous-supreme-court-decisions-aremore-common-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/ESF7-RWU2] (“The most recent term, in fact, was
the least partisan since the middle of the 20th century. Over half of the cases were unanimous, and
only 14 percent were decided by a 5–3 or 5–4 split.”); Sarah Turberville & Anthony Marcum, Those
5–4 Decisions on the Supreme Court? 9 to 0 is Far More Common, WASH. POST (June 28, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/06/28/those-5-4-decisionson-the-supreme-court-9-0-is-far-more-common/ [https://perma.cc/QL7P-TDZ8] (“According to
the Supreme Court Database, since 2000 a unanimous decision has been more likely than any other
result—averaging 36 percent of all decisions.”).
23 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 5 (ﬁnding 29% of cases in the October 2018 term were
decided 5–4); see also Turberville & Marcum, supra note 22 (ﬁnding that 19% of cases were decided
5–4 from 2000 to 2018).
24 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 5.
25 Id. at 5, 19.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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Although the judges-as-politicians narrative may feel like a convenient,
tidy way to explain judicial decisions, we see that it does not pass muster
when subjected to close scrutiny. Granted, these are just statistics, and they
do not tell the full story. But they do help place the narrative of a
hyperpartisan judiciary into a better perspective.
And yet there are a few cases each year in which Supreme Court Justices
are starkly divided, deciding issues where the terrain has been less travelled
and the societal stakes are high. These are areas where not only is there often
no controlling law, but there are strongly divergent views among the populace
as to the desired outcome. But in these cases, the role of the judge is the same,
although perhaps more diﬃcult and controversial: that is, to rule analytically
and not viscerally. Would we say that in these few cases they should somehow
be accountable to the people for these rulings, or should we be content that
they are adhering to legal principles, although disagreeing as to which ones
trump others, in a sincere attempt to ﬁnd the right result? I suggest the latter.
In my experience on the Third Circuit, even the sharpest disagreements I’ve
had with my colleagues were grounded in competing views of the facts and the
law; they were not political or agenda-driven. I am reminded of an appeal that
came before a panel that included myself and then-Judge Sam Alito, Mellott v.
Heemer.31 That case involved the government’s attempt to evict a family, the
Mellotts, living in a rural area of Pennsylvania.32 The Mellotts had resisted
numerous court orders and were “holed up” in their farmhouse, reportedly with
numerous firearms.33 Several U.S. Marshals showed up with guns drawn and
proceeded to force them out of their house at gunpoint.34
Judge Alito and the other panel judge viewed this as appropriate police
conduct as a matter of law.35 I, on the other hand, viewed it as involving force
that a jury could ﬁnd to be excessive.36 Was this political and predictable?
Well, it was perhaps predictable but not political. We were each viewing the
scene as our backgrounds might predict—Judge Alito had been a prosecutor
and could empathize with the sheriﬀs who were uncertain of what they might
encounter out in the middle of nowhere; I, on the other hand, had been a
bankruptcy lawyer and had seen people being evicted and understood their
plight and their relative powerlessness at the hands of the government. I like
161 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 119-20; see id. at 126 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (describing the precedent relied upon by
the majority, which “involved the propriety of the arrests of individuals wanted for assault, holed up
in a home in an otherwise peaceful seashore community, and the extent of force employed by teams
of law enforcement”).
34 Id. at 120-21 (majority opinion).
35 Id. at 123-25.
36 Id. at 125, 127.
31
32
33
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to think that our diﬀerence of opinion was not because he had a conservative
agenda and I a liberal one. No, his mind’s eye drew a very diﬀerent picture
from mine. While the public might think that judicial rulings are outcome
determinative, and judges come to a case with an agenda, I have not found that
to be the case. If we can understand why two people react differently when
presented with a Rorschach test, we should be able to accept the premise that
differences between how judges view situations can be as easily explained by
experiences and influences in their lives as by “political” views or “agendas.”
II. CURRENT ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES
Before we begin to consider whether more accountability is needed in the
judiciary, it is helpful to review what measures are already in place. First and
foremost, there are the measures embodied in the text of the Constitution.
These include life tenure, the prohibition on salary reductions, and the case
and controversy requirement.37 In their own ways, these measures advance
the twin goals of independence and accountability (as I conceive of it). They
ensure that judges are independent from political forces and accountable to
the rule of law. We cannot overstate the importance of these provisions. As
Judge Harvie Wilkinson put it, “The contention that life tenure is
unimportant would be made, if at all, only by someone who had never
experienced the alternative.”38 Moreover, the case and controversy
requirement, although discussed less in the popular discourse than life
tenure, is just as important. We do not seek out cases to decide. We are
confined to the controversy before us, but the converse is also true. We must
resolve the particular case and controversy before us. And in doing so, we
endeavor to write narrowly, avoiding constitutional issues if possible. As I
wrote earlier this year, speaking for the Third Circuit on a case that had
important public policy implications: “In resolving the discrete legal
question before us, . . . we make no judgment as to the merits of this policy
dispute. Rather, our role is more confined, and our focus is only on the
legality of the particular action before us.”39 This approach keeps our focus
squarely on the rule of law, even when politics loom large in a particular case.
Moving on to the nonconstitutional formal accountability measures, our
system of judicial review is designed to ensure a judge cannot “go rogue.”
First, the district court renders a decision that is subject to appellate review.40
That means after a district judge decides a case, a new set of fresh eyes, usually
37
38
39
40

U.S. CONST. art 3, §§ 1, 2.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 782 (1989).
City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019).
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).
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three sets, will review the decision. Such a review is intended to correct any
ruling that may have been simply wrong as a matter of law under a de novo
standard or constituted an abuse of discretion. If the case is of particular
importance, the full appellate court may hear it.41 While the number of judges
varies from court to court, on the Third Circuit, that means fourteen judges
would then review the decision. That decision can then be the subject of a
petition for review to the United States Supreme Court,42 where, if granted,
another nine judges will review the decision. As noted above, the fact that the
vast majority of cases in both the appellate courts and the Supreme Court are
decided unanimously suggests that any fear of judges running amok is
misplaced and that our system is doing a good job of keeping judges
accountable while maintaining independence.
We also abide by a Judicial Code of Conduct.43 The Code forbids “family,
social, political, ﬁnancial, or other relationships to inﬂuence judicial conduct
or judgment.”44 The Code also “provide[s] standards of conduct for
application in proceedings under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.”45 Far from a toothless vessel, the Code
is the benchmark to which judges will ultimately be held if a misconduct
complaint is ﬁled.46 The Code is only strengthened by our operating
procedures: our recusal procedures provide an opportunity for judges to
ensure they won’t ﬁnd themselves in a position in which their impartiality
may be questioned.47 Judicial independence is best served when we hold
ourselves accountable; these formal procedures do exactly that.
And, perhaps most importantly, there are the informal norms that, as
judges, we dedicate ourselves to follow. I’m reminded of a time I was once
asked by a fourth grade student, “Is judging what you do, or is it who you
are?” It might be the most perceptive question I have ever been asked. Surely,
the answer is: the latter. Before taking the bench in 1994, I had practiced law
for twenty-one years and interacted with judges professionally and socially.
Yet, I had no idea how seriously judges take their roles—and responsibility—
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1254.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 9.
Id. at Canon 2(B).
Id. at Canon 1, cmt.
See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (“Any person alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the eﬀective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts . . . may ﬁle with the
clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint . . . ”).
47 See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATION
PROCEDURES OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 11.1.1 (2018) (“Before
cases are sent to a panel, the clerk transmits copies of the docket sheets and disclosure statements to
each judge who responds promptly informing the clerk of those cases in which the judge is recused.”).
41
42
43
44
45
46
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as judges and how deeply their fealty to the rule of law runs. How could I not
have known this? Because I had never been a judge. That is not just what we
do, it is who we are. We are mere mouthpieces for the rule of law. As I
envision it, we try not to let ourselves get in the way of the law. I am sure that
members of the other branches of government must feel a similar weight of
responsibility to the electorate and take their roles seriously as well. But the
judiciary is singularly faithful to an ideal—the rule of law—and along with it,
its consistency and its perceived fairness.
One of the most important informal constraints is, as Judge Wilkinson
has put it, our “accountability to reason.”48 As judges we issue orders, but we
must explain those orders with reasoned opinions. Those opinions are subject
to criticism from a variety of sources, including a higher court, a dissenting
colleague, and members of the legal academy. Judges are sensitive to criticism
that their opinions are not tightly reasoned and endeavor to ensure that their
opinions are airtight. Indeed, in my experience, my colleagues and I have
often decided, after coming to a conclusion about a case, that the opinion
“won’t write.” That is, although we had agreed upon a certain outcome at
conference, we found that, after putting pen to paper, the conclusion could
not be supported by the law. In these circumstances, we don’t just forge ahead
with an unsupported conclusion—we change course. This is what Judge Frank
Coﬃn was referring to when he wrote that “[t]he act of writing tells us what
was wrong with the act of thinking.”49
Another area which exemplifies our self-imposed accountability to the rule
of law is our commitment to following precedent. Nothing prevents a district
judge from casting aside precedent (although the judge would almost certainly
be reversed on appeal). And nothing stops a three-judge panel from rewriting
the circuit’s law (although the panel, too, would almost certainly be reversed if
the case proceeded to be heard by the full court en banc). But judges follow
precedent nonetheless. To be sure, the threat of reversal plays a role; no one
likes being reversed. But our reasons for following precedent run deeper than
that. Of the foremost maxims of the rule of law are publicity, clarity, and
stability.50 Following precedent furthers all three: untethered from precedent,
the law would lose its stability, potentially oscillating in meaning from opinion
to opinion. Vacillating interpretations, in turn, prevent the law from having a
clear meaning. Thus, its true content would be unknown, indeed unknowable,
Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 781.
FRANK. M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH 57 (1980); see also Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 798 (“Nothing in the
Constitution requires the written justiﬁcation of judicial decisions, but a judiciary accountable to
reason cannot resort to arbitrary acts.”).
50 See Waldron, supra note 4.
48
49
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to the public. When the public cannot determine what the law is, it cannot
modify its behavior in accordance with it, and the rule of law crumbles.
Although the Supreme Court is not “bound” by precedent in the way we are,
and can overrule a prior decisions, it does so sparingly, as the same reasons we
follow precedent underpin the high court’s doctrine of stare decisis.51
Another way of looking at our practice of following precedent is that it is
an act of judicial humility. It is a recognition that we (either a single district
court or a panel of judges) should not start from ﬁrst principles in every case.
We must stand on the shoulders of those who came before us—we must rely
on, and build on, their wisdom. One of our most eminent Founding Fathers,
James Wilson, recognized this when he wrote: “[A] judge . . . should bear a
great regard to the sentiments and decisions of those, who have thought and
decided before him.”52 Wilson was writing about common law judges in
particular,53 but his rationale applies to our modern federal courts as well. By
building on the decisions that came before us—strengthening and clarifying
them to the best of our ability and correcting errors when necessary—we
engage in a collective eﬀort to strengthen the rule of law.
Rather than a reason to call for external accountability, diﬀerences of
opinion and perspectives are aspects of our system that we should recognize
as features—not ﬂaws—in the system. When you think about it, diversity of
views (as opposed to adherence to King George’s dictates) makes our country
what it is today.
III. THE PERILS OF INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY
TO POLITICAL ACTORS
Any criticism of an independent judiciary must offer some alternative. It
is not enough to say that an independent judiciary is not perfect. It is not. But
humans are not perfect. And thus no institution left to the hands and minds
of mere mortals will be perfect. Any criticism of an independent judiciary
must demonstrate, then, how another way—e.g., a judiciary that is more
accountable to Congress or the people—will be better. A good start would be:
show me an example of an “accountable” judiciary that is better than our
independent judiciary. I, for one, cannot find one. But by looking to history,
to other nations, and to various state governments in the United States, I can
quite easily find “accountable” judiciaries that exhibit serious problems.
51 “[S]tare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary to ensure that legal rules
develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion.’” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782,
798 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
52 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 198 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
53 Id.
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Let’s start with our history. Judicial independence, to the American
mind, can be taken for granted as a fixed star of our constitutional order.
This is not surprising, as we’ve been blessed with an independent judiciary
for over 200 years. But the history of our nation is still young, at least
relative to the history of civilized human life. When we step back for a
broader perspective we see that our 230-year experiment with an
independent judiciary is just that—an experiment. Indeed, it is the
exception to the much darker and troubling rule: the arbitrary exercise of
government power. And we see that even at the time of the American
founding, despite thousands of years of significant developments in the
law, the concept of an independent judiciary was still in its infancy, if it
existed at all.
The British made major strides toward an independent judiciary with
the Act of Settlement 1701, which provided that judges’ commissions would
be valid during good behavior.54 But Parliament remained sovereign, and
thus could dominate the judiciary; and good-behavior tenure did not carry
over to the colonies, where judges were appointed by the crown, paid by the
crown, and served at the pleasure of the crown.55 Thus, the mix of
accountability and independence was vastly different from what we have
today: judges were much more accountable to political actors, less
accountable to the rule of law, and had very limited independence.
Historian Gordon Wood writes that judges at this time were regarded as
“lesser magistrates tied to the governors or chief magistrates.”56 Indeed,
legal training was not viewed as a necessary condition to attaining a judicial
position: “Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts, for example, who was no
lawyer, was in the 1760s chief justice of the superior court, lieutenant
governor, a member of the council, and judge of probate Suffolk County all
at the same time.”57 Not exactly an independent judiciary.
What were the results of this arrangement? Most importantly, trust in
judicial officers was abysmal, as the people did not believe that judges
could act in an independent and impartial manner. Thomas Jefferson, for
example, remarked in 1776 that the actions of judges had been “the

54 See Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3 (Eng.) (“[J]udges commissions be made
quamdiu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of
both houses of parliament it may be lawful to remove them.”).
55 See John D. Ferrick, Impeaching Federal Judges. A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1970) (“From the earliest days, judges were appointed by the Crown and
given ‘patents’ which ﬁxed their terms.”).
56 Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 49, 54 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2018).
57 Id. at 55.
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eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing [men].”58 The House
of Massachusetts declared that any judge who accepted his salary from the
crown “has it in his heart to promote the establishment of an arbitrary
government in the province.”59 And, in the end, this distrust helped spur
the colonists to revolution.
Fast forwarding to today, we can look around the world and see the perils of
a judiciary that is accountable to external actors. In China, judicial independence
isn’t just missing, it isn’t seen as desirable. Zhou Qiang, the President of the
Supreme People’s Court, recently urged his fellow citizens to “bare your swords
towards false western ideals like judicial independence.”60 And in Russia,
Freedom House has noted that “[t]he judiciary lacks independence from the
executive branch, and career advancement is effectively tied to compliance with
Kremlin preferences.”61 As a consequence, “[s]afeguards against arbitrary arrest
and other due process guarantees are regularly violated” and “[p]rivate
businesses . . . are routinely targeted for extortion or expropriation by law
enforcement officials.”62 These are the unfortunate consequences of a lack of
judicial independence.
We need not venture that far to find disincentives to independence.
Many state and county judges stand for elections. Thirty-eight states elect
their supreme court judges.63 It is not that elected judges do not take their
role and responsibilities seriously, but it must be more difficult to be
independent when forces other than the discrete law and facts before you—
which could cause you to lose your job at the next retention election—are
at play. Candidates for judicial elections, for example, will often be the
target of television ads suggesting they are too “soft on crime.”64 Many ads
attack judges for specific decisions they made.65 As a result, studies have
shown that elected trial judges will issue more punitive sentences and
58 Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 505 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
59 BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 108
(Belknap Press 1992) (1967).
60 Lucy Hornby, China’s Top Judge Denounces Judicial Independence, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/60dddd46-dc74-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce [https://perma.cc/CEM2-H63B].
61 Freedom in the World 2019: Russia, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2019/russia [https://perma.cc/A4RM-24H6] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
62 Id.
63 A LICIA B ANNON ET AL ., B RENNAN C TR . FOR J USTICE , W HO P AYS FOR J UDICIAL
R ACES ? 1 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Politics_
of_Judicial_Elections_Final.pdf. [https://perma.cc/LTZ5-TZLT].
64 K ATE B ERRY , B RENNAN C TR . FOR J USTICE , H OW J UDICIAL E LECTIONS I MPACT
C RIMINAL C ASES 3-4 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
How_Judicial_Elections_Impact_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZJW-8PYC].
65 Id.
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elected appellate judges will be less likely to rule in favor of a criminal
defendant during an election year.66 Such a system of accountability to the
people has a clear negative effect on the independence of the judiciary.
Therefore, perhaps we should zealously guard the federal court system
we have, rather than risk weakening the judiciary’s independence with the
addition of new, external accountability. Our system has allowed our society
to reap the benefits of an independent judiciary. Much has been written
about the judiciary’s role in holding public actors to account; an
independent judiciary is a bulwark against the arbitrary exercise of power,
a protection for civil liberties, and a check on public corruption. But judicial
independence also has an enormous effect on private law and, consequently,
economic development.67 Indeed, studies have shown that “[t]he degree of
judicial independence is correlated with economic growth.”68 Aside from
the wealth of empirical evidence for this claim, it also makes intuitive sense.
If you are starting a business—and, thus, need to rent or buy property and
equipment, hire a workforce, obtain a patent, or gain regulatory approval
for your enterprise—your chances of prospering are greater if you live in a
country in which the courts have clear, established practices for interpreting
legal questions, its rulings are to some degree timely and predictable, and
you can expect a ruling free of interference from political forces. Moreover,
the mere presence of such a functional system causes the citizenry to abide
by the laws for the most part; the courts are there to resolve disputes or
enforce compliance when needed. Our judicial system is by no means
perfect, but the United States has consistently ranked near the top of the
world for ease of doing business—a ranking that is to a large extent powered
by the strength of our judicial system.69
IV. THE NEED FOR GREATER CIVICS EDUCATION
While all of the above measures are well and good, there is obviously a
gap between what the judiciary does and how people perceive it, which leads
Id. at 7-9.
See generally, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Introduction, The Judiciary’s Role in Economic Prosperity,
44 IND. L. REV. 987, 992 (2011) (arguing that to contribute to the economy and job growth, “[c]ourts
must maintain their independence and impartiality” and “lay down the clearest rules possible and
then follow them in a predictable way so that businesses can plan their aﬀairs”).
68 Kenneth Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development 1 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 287, 2006), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-judiciary-and-economicdevelopment/ [https://perma.cc/2J9Y-YU7T].
69 See WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2020, at 4 tbl.0.1, 33 (2019) (ranking the United
States sixth in the world in terms of ease of doing business and noting that “[j]udicial eﬃciency is
essential to ﬁrm productivity”).
66
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to confusion and resulting calls for external accountability. I believe the
problem lies in a failure to properly teach what the courts do and how they
do it. In 2016, the Annenberg Public Policy Center found that only 26% of
Americans could name the three branches of the federal government.70 Two
years hasn’t had us fare much better: in 2018, only 32% knew all three
branches, and 33% could not name a single branch.71 While most states
require a civics course in high school, no states course exceeds one year, and
thirty-one states only require a half-year of civics education.72 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, surveys show that significant knowledge of civics and the
workings of the Supreme Court leads to a greater willingness to protect the
Supreme Court’s decisional independence.73 As Kathleen Hall Jamieson,
director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, has noted,
The survey shows the important role that understanding of the
Constitution plays in the public’s support for an independent judiciary. But
it is worrisome both that 1 in 5 [citizens surveyed] would consider doing
away with the Supreme Court if it were to issue a lot of unpopular decisions
and that 1 in 4 think it would be OK for Congress to strip jurisdiction from
the [C]ourt in instances in which it disagrees with the [C]ourt’s ruling.74

I fear that these results stem from a lack of genuine understanding as to
how we decide cases. Our role is not to do the will of the people; that’s
Congress’s job. We do not concern ourselves with whether our rulings are
popular, but, rather, whether they are faithful to precedent and the law as it
is and should be.
So, we need to do better. We need to teach our children about our
system and how the independence of the judiciary is a valued, animating
principle that must be preserved and protected. We judges need to be
clearer in explaining what we are deciding and why we are deciding a case
a certain way. Our opinions are, for the most part, well reasoned, but we
need to make our opinions transparent and more easily understandable to
the average citizen and the media who report on them. And we need the
70 Americans’ Knowledge of the Branches of Government Is Declining, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y
CTR. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-knowledge-of-thebranches-of-government-is-declining/ [https://perma.cc/Y7WP-PKDU].
71 Civics Knowledge Predicts Willingness to Protect Supreme Court, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y
CTR. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/civics-knowledge-surveywillingness-protect-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/N7EU-KZS7].
72 CATHERINE BROWN & SHARAH SHAPIRO, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE STATE OF
CIVICS EDUCATION 5-6 (2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k12/reports/2018/02/21/446857/state-civics-education/ [https://perma.cc/3VGX-QXYU].
73 Civics Knowledge Predicts Willingness to Protect Supreme Court, supra note 71.
74 Id.
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citizenry to try to understand our rulings and the reasoning behind them
and not criticize judges merely because they do not agree with the outcome
of a particular case. And, yes, accountability that ensures adherence to the
rule of law may well be the other side of the coin of judicial independence.
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